Vincent Kompanys Burnley: How players and fans can expect his team to play -

For nearly 10 years, Burnley supporters watched Dyche-ball.

It was not the prettiest but it was effective, delivering two promotions and seven seasons in the Premier League.

As Sean Dyche’s tenure drew to an end, frustrations were growing. The tried and tested methods were no longer working.

Now, Burnley have a new man in charge and a different system to watch. Vincent Kompany will bring his style but what does that look like and how different will it be? 4-3-3? 4-2-3-1? 3-5-2? No, it will still be 4-4-2.

That is the expectation, anyway, with that being Kompany’s preferred system during the 2021-22 campaign at Anderlecht. During his first season in charge, he opted for a 4-3-3 but as time went on, he settled on a version of 4-4-2.

“Possession with impact,” is how Kompany described his style to Rio Ferdinand’s Five podcast last year. “I include impact so I don’t get put down as just possession, tiki-taka.

“I like mobility and runs to free up people between the lines and choose if you want to play between the lines or deep (over the top). I have to have an aggressive team.”

Kompany installed a possession-based style that carried a significant threat. Last season, Anderlecht scored 72 goals in the regular season (2.1 goals per game); an increase from the 51 a year earlier.

They finished third in the Belgian Pro League last season, averaging 56.6 per cent possession, and that ball retention matches their creativity, with Anderlecht averaging 14.7 shots per 90 minutes and 4.5 shots on target per 90, ranking them fourth and fifth highest in the league for those metrics.

The Athletic ventured into their own version of Mike Jackson’s bat cave to gain an insight into what Burnley’s system could look like…

Build-up play

One of the first noticeable features of Anderlecht was the system switch when in possession. A consistent theme is central midfielder Josh Cullen dropping deep into the right of a back three.

Cullen was an important cog in Kompany’s system, demonstrated by him featuring in all 34 regular season games for Anderlecht and, unsurprisingly, the Republic of Ireland international has been one of the first names linked to a Turf Moor move.

By having Cullen drop into a back three, the full-backs, Sergio Gomez and Michael Murillo, effectively became wing-backs in more advanced positions, providing width.

Naturally, the two wide midfielders moved inside and into the space created by Cullen’s absence and his midfield partner being central. It gave Kompany’s shape a more balanced look. If they stayed wide, it would leave Cullen’s partner outnumbered and with too much ground to cover.

There are small tweaks Kompany can make and sometimes his right-back will be instructed to act as the third centre-back. Cullen remained in midfield and looked to use his passing ability higher up the pitch. Gomez, the left-back, was given greater freedom to get forward.

Under Pep Guardiola, the biggest thing Kompany learnt was the importance of using and creating space through off-the-ball movement. Stretching the pitch using the full-backs creates more space between the lines for his attacking midfielder. Kompany wants those players to be mobile and technical.

This is where Cullen’s passing range became important. Below, Cullen switched play and Lior Refaelov dropped deep to receive possession with Gomez overlapping him. The pair combined to begin an attack that led to a goal.

Anderlecht were quite happy to be patient in possession and wait until space opened up which they then looked to exploit — Cullen dropping into the back three was the starting point.

When Murillo was out wide, naturally the right midfielder — Anouar Ait El Hadj on this occasion — drifted into an inside position.

As possession was recycled, El Hadj made a run towards the ball, distracting the opposition defence and opening up space behind him with the opposition full-back concentrating on Murillo.

As a result, Benito Raman maintained his position and Taylor Harwood-Bellis lofted a ball over the top to send him through on goal.

It is demonstrated further here. This time, the ball was worked out to Murillo who maintained a deeper role. Francis Amuzu took up the inside position and again moved towards the ball, opening up the space for striker Joshua Zirkzee.

Anderlecht advanced up the pitch thanks to Zirkzee’s hold-up play. Murillo received possession and then slipped Azumu, who had taken up Zirkzee’s position, behind the Vitesse Arnhem defence.

He then had the simple task of squaring the ball to Raman.

The front four

In possession, Anderlecht’s formation looked more like 4-2-4 or 4-2-2-2 because Kompany gives his four attacking players the licence to roam and float.

A problem Burnley had with the 4-4-2 system was the disconnect between midfield and attack, with their two strikers isolated. Kompany is keen to avoid that — his wide midfielders tend to operate centrally and more closely to the forwards.

There are different ways Anderlecht looked to attack and it goes back to the quote at the beginning of the article. Kompany wants mobile strikers who are able to run the channels but they need to be technically sound to receive possession and link play.

Zirkzee was integral to that last season and had a combination of all of the attributes Kompany wanted.

In the first example, he dropped off to receive possession from deep. Wide midfielder Yari Verschaeren took up a narrow position and when the pass was played to his team-mate he immediately began his run.

Zirkzee turned quickly and slipped the youngster in, sending him one-on-one with the goalkeeper.

Runs from out to in were a common theme of the two attacking midfielders. Kompany used players who were agile and technically gifted in those positions to supply the creative spark and be willing runners.

A second example shows the front four in full flow — Refaelov was in a deeper role but made himself available as Zirkzee held the ball up after receiving a pass. Christian Kouame and Verschaeren made runs beyond the ball with the latter making that out-to-in run.

Refaelov spotted it and because he was making that run, got to the line-breaking pass first. He fed Kouame, who was through on goal.

The fluidity of the front four was what led to a large portion of Anderlecht’s attacking creativity.

The instructions appear clear: move the ball quickly and decisively with sharp, short passes to beat defences.

A great example was another of their goals against Antwerp when Kristian Arnstad turned away from his marker into space. Immediately, three team-mates were making runs forward.

He passed to Kouame who played a one-two with Zirkzee, drawing the defenders across…

…before squaring to the back post for Amuzu to score.

Kompany’s full-backs were expected to contribute to Anderlecht’s attacking play and the system allowed them to get forward. Gomez and Murillo were given the licence to break beyond the midfield.

Verschaeren spotted the advancing Gomez and switched the play to him.

After quick interplay with Refaelov, he got to the byline and crossed for Verschaeren to finish.

Often when Anderlecht built play, you saw three or four of the attacking players in the box looking to get on the end of crosses.

The wide forwards were required to provide the crosses and be an outlet if needed. Against Mechelen, Zirkzee collected possession deep…

…and instead of making an inside run, Refaelov stayed wide, delivering a cross for Zirkzee to finish the move he began.

Out of possession

Off the ball, Anderlecht’s attacking, fluid system became a solid flat 4-4-2 with defined roles that made them difficult to break down.

Put this image into black and white and… it looks a lot like Burnley out of possession.

Kompany’s defensive record in his two campaigns in charge was impressive, conceding 70 goals in 68 regular-season games across his two years.

You would expect no less from a manager who was a central defender at the highest level and he prides himself on using a stable back line as a foundation to let his attacking players flourish.

Their defensive identity started from the front. Kompany wants his teams to be aggressive and pressing is a key part of his principles. He wants players suited to play in that system — mobile, quick and disciplined.

Again, it looks similar to how Dyche’s Burnley would set up when pressing the opposition high.

The two strikers lead the press from the front with one of the central midfielders stepping out from their bank of four to press the deepest opposition midfielder.

In this example, Anderlecht are in their 4-4-2 shape and looking to press Antwerp. Zirkzee and Kouame cut off the passing options for the centre-backs and Cullen pushed onto the deep midfielder.

Anderlecht forced their opposition back to their goalkeeper but continued to be aggressive with their press and a slack pass from the goalkeeper allowed Cullen to pounce.

When Cullen won possession, immediately the front four players supported and took up attacking positions.

Anderlecht worked the ball to Azumu to score.

Although not every pressing situation leads to a goalscoring opportunity, the aim was to force their opponent to go long, which increased the chance of winning the ball back via an inaccurate pass or aerial duel or to try to play around them.

If they attempted the second option, Anderlecht’s two wide midfielders would lie in wait and, depending on which side the pass goes, the midfield four shuffled across. The relevant full-back would press high to squeeze the opponent about to receive possession and limit his passing options.

Club Brugge attempt this from a goal kick but Verschaeren was quick to press and was backed up by full-back Gomez, with Cullen and Marco Kana cutting off passing lanes. It resulted in Brugge having to play a risky pass into midfield.

Whenever they played in a 4-4-2 and wanted to press high, recovery and discipline were crucial. If the opposition were able to play out of the initial press, Kompany’s side were drilled to quickly drop back into a solid defensive shape.

In this instance, Hannes Delcroix’s challenge was picked up by a Brugge player and they switched the play. However, Anderlecht recovered quickly to get the right side of the ball and back in their narrow shape.

There are dangers with playing a 4-4-2 system, which Burnley fans know well. If opposition players can find space between the defence and midfield, they become dangerous. Equally, with Kompany encouraging his full-backs to push on, if Anderlecht lost possession they were in danger of being counter-attacked quickly.

Kompany wanted them to be aggressive but statistically they were passive. They ranked 17th out of 18 teams for interceptions (379) and tackles won (377) during the league campaign.

Given they dominated possession in most games, you would have expected them to be low on the list as they spend less time without the ball but Genk and Club Brugge, who averaged more possession per game, ranked mid-table in both categories.

The similarities between Anderlecht and Burnley’s defensive shapes should help the transition defensively for the players Kompany is going to inherit.

A key priority will be deciding and signing a partner for Nathan Collins, who should be an important part of Kompany’s spine, to build an important foundation at the back as Dyche did with James Tarkowski and Ben Mee.

The young Irish defender excelled when called upon last season and will relish the prospect of working with one of the best modern centre-backs.

Theoretically, Burnley should be one of the better teams in the Championship next season and would be expected to dominate games. It suggests Kompany should not have to tweak his tactics too much.

It may be the same system on paper but Kompany’s Burnley should look a lot different on the eye to the one supporters became used to watching.

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